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Lenin's Mausoleum: Fractured Russian Identity and Trauma in Post-Soviet Memory

What is Russia, in one image? Most likely, Red Square comes to mind. Bordered by the Kremlin and containing the St. Basil's Cathedral, this site at the center of Moscow is the international symbol of Russianness. Away from the thronging crowds of tourists sits a squat pyramid with an imposing title: ЛЕНИН. This is the mausoleum of Vladimir Lenin, the founding father of the Soviet Union. Lenin has been dead nearly a century, and the Soviet Union nearly three decades, yet here they are in the very heart of modern Russia. In my 2018 visit, I recall descending from a hot summer day into the dark, cool temple, past a tight security check. In front of me went an old Russian woman. Watching her as she passed the open coffin containing an embalmed Lenin, she made the sign of the cross. Guards soon after hurried her, and then me, along back out into the heat and din of Red Square. For years since I have pondered her meaning. Was she making a sign of Christian veneration to the atheist, mass-murderer Lenin? Or was it for divine protection from his evil presence? The experience goes to the heart of Lenin's memory in Russia, and more broadly, the memory of the Soviet system he forged and was made to represent. What does the continued presence of Lenin's mausoleum in Red Square reveal about post-Soviet memory in modern Russia?

One would expect that Lenin's mausoleum would be a symbol of his beliefs and regime. With such expectations, supporters of Lenin would support keeping his body on display there and vice versa. However, this is not the case. Public attitudes towards the mausoleum, either in favor of or in opposition to the final burial of Lenin, are split mildly in favor of the former (see Appendices D and E). Examining the reasons for this divergence opinions, also available in polling data, reveals a curious phenomenon concerning how Russian people tend to view the mausoleum. Namely, the question of what to do with Lenin's body is rarely tied up with the legacy of his policies and beliefs.

Rather, most supporters of burial simply believe that corpses belong in the ground, regardless of who they belonged to.[1] This disconnect between the symbol of Lenin and the legacy of Lenin continues when examining the political attitudes and the official government position on the mausoleum. While some politicians support burial, the government continues to exhibit Lenin's body in order to preserve continuity with the previous regime and out of respect to those citizens who lived their entire lives with Lenin as a state idol.[2] Both positions raise questions. If the crimes of the Soviet Union, which began under Lenin's command, are well known to the Russian people, why is his mausoleum not a symbol of this legacy? If Lenin has nothing to do with the current regime, which has indeed replaced his own, why has he been continually presented in Red Square for the last 29 years? Clearly, there is something peculiar in Russia's treatment of Lenin's mausoleum: Russians, as a collective, do not know what to make of it. To better understand the implications and causes of this phenomenon, the synthesis of the following two theoretical frameworks is helpful. Independent researcher in cultural studies Ian Russell's analysis of object-space as a foundation of group identity, called materialization, allows us to take Lenin's mausoleum as a symbol of Russian identity. The disparate views concerning the symbol, then, indicate a fractured national identity in modern Russia. Ciano Aydin, professor of philosophy at the University of Twente, offers an explanation for this fractured identity in his analysis of cultural trauma and its solution, active forgetting. The trauma, of course, is the history of political repression starting under Lenin. By analyzing contemporary views on Lenin's mausoleum and the fractured national identity they indicate, I argue that its continued presentation reveals that the memory of Soviet crimes in modern Russia is incomplete. Russia's inability to process its Soviet past has far reaching implications for its future and are of utmost

[1] Gill, "'Lenin Lives': Or Does He? Symbols and the Transition from Socialism," 182-183.
[2] The Economist, "Bury Lenin."

importance to not only the Russian people but the entire world that must live and cooperate with the resurgent global power.

For background on the mausoleum's history and the history of Soviet crimes refer to the timelines in Appendices A and B.[3] This paper will first introduce the theoretical frameworks of cultural trauma and group identity that undergird its analysis. It will then move into a discussion of the monument itself: its symbolism during the Soviet period and today. The modern period will be divided into arguments in favor of and in opposition to Lenin's burial according to the two stakeholders: the Russian people and their government. Having established the frameworks and the disparate views on mausoleum, the paper will demonstrate that the disparate views are indicative of a shattered identity. Furthermore, it will argue that such an identity is a symptom of unresolved cultural trauma pertaining to crimes of the Soviet period. For context, it will further explain why post-Soviet memory is so complicated because of the many historical circumstances that make it unique in the realm of cultural traumas. To conclude, it will emphasize why the processing of Soviet crimes is a necessity for the future success of the Russian people.

Despite its focus on genocide, this paper will apply the philosophical-sociological concept of cultural memory laid out by Ciano Aydin in his essay "How to Forget the Unforgettable? On Collective Trauma, Cultural Identity, and Mnemotechnologies." Aydin, following Nietzsche, treats the psyche of a collective just like that of an individual; it has a past and future, memory and aspirations.[4] Similarly, a society can suffer from traumatic memories. According to Aydin, trauma occurs when an event "completely overwhelm[s] the ability of victims to grasp and cope with what

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[3] To clarify, this paper will take as a given that the Soviet Union was among the most repressive states of world history, whose history is steeped in the blood of innocents. It will also take as a given that Lenin is culpable, if not directly responsible, in all Soviet crimes. While his culpability is a topic of ongoing scholarly and ideological debate, this paper will adopt the more critical view, as it is the author's belief and simplifies the term "Soviet crimes" to include all periods, not just those before Lenin's early death.

[4] Aydin, "How to Forget the Unforgettable? On Collective Trauma, Cultural Identity, and Mnemotechnologies."

happened; that is, to integrate the ideas and emotions that are instigated by that experience in a conceivable and acceptable narrative."[5] Trauma lives in the realm of memories, such that though the people who suffered a traumatic event are long gone, the collective memory of it is passed down to subsequent generations in the form of mental illnesses, a well-documented phenomenon.[6] Unresolved trauma results in an inability to escape the past, thereby depriving a society of its future.[7] If the problem of trauma lies in remembering, the solution lies in active forgetting. Active forgetting refers to the natural defense mechanism of the human or collective mind to a painful memory that can be best described as a balancing act, simultaneously remembering its significance while "giv[ing] traumatic events their proper place in [a society's] history."[8] Difficult to grasp initially, Aydin helpfully outlines three efforts necessary to actively forget successfully: "recognition, (symbolic) processing, and sublimation."[9] Recognition, the precursor to all other efforts, refers to the society's complete understanding of the traumatic event coupled with acknowledgement from all stakeholders, victims and perpetrators alike.[10] The next of Aydin's three efforts, processing, involves "integrating and incorporating it into the identity of the victimized culture in such a way that the capacity of forgetting can be restored."[11] Processing reduces the monstrousness of the trauma to a manageable, but not insignificant scale.[12] This can take a variety of forms, but is best formalized as a custom or ritual in the affected society.[13] Aydin's third and final effort is sublimation, the process of redirecting the pain of a traumatic event into positive and productive avenues, like artistic

[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Aydin, "How to Forget the Unforgettable? On Collective Trauma, Cultural Identity, and Mnemotechnologies."
[13] Ibid.

expression.[14] In essence, resolving cultural trauma requires a conscious effort to put the past in its place. Already, it appears that Lenin's looming presence is a peculiar way of forgetting the past.

So far, this paper has introduced cultural trauma assuming that such a collective grouping is appropriate for modern Russian society, but this may not be the case. We must first ask what constitutes a large group collective? Ian Russell, in his essay "Freud and Volkan: Psychoanalysis, group identities and archaeology" describes seven constituent aspects, seven threads in the metaphorical tent of group identity.[15] The first five are self-explanatory and easily visible in a given group. They are shared identifications, identification against another group, internal demands by leadership, chosen glories, and chosen traumas.[16] Only the final two threads, suitable reservoirs and protosymbols, will be addressed in this paper. Both concern the relationship between a collective and an object-space, in other words, symbolism. Russell explains that symbolism can be a foundation of group identity: "when an entire group share an object relation or a 'reservoir' of un-integrated externalisations, then we can see that relation constituting a development of group identity."[17] Such symbols are powerful tools for internalizing the group values that they are associated with.[18] Russell applies this relationship between people and object, called materialization, to archeology. This paper will instead apply it to the lens of Lenin's mausoleum. If the mausoleum is a materialization of Russian identity, what are the "abstract concepts" ascribed to it by the collective?

Since its inception, Lenin's mausoleum was intended to be a materialization of the Soviet identity, and a particularly powerful one because of its unique material: human flesh. Though Lenin

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[14] Ibid.
[15] Russell, "Freud and Volkan: Psychoanalysis, Group Identities and Archaeology,"186.
[16] Ibid, 186-189.
Identification against another group refers to the othering of outsiders and the projection of opposing values on another, different group. Chosen glories and chosen traumas both concern the mythical or historical narratives a group constructs for itself.
[17] Ibid, 189.
[18] Russell, "Freud and Volkan: Psychoanalysis, Group Identities and Archaeology,"189.

eschewed the cult of personality that would come to define his successor, Stalin, and wished to be buried with his family in Petrograd (named Leningrad only after his death), his Bolshevik comrades needed Lenin's popularity with the people to legitimate their still shaky authority.[19] Despite their atheist beliefs, the party consciously sought "to rebuild Lenin as a quasi-god of the future [communist] religion," as MIT doctoral student Alla Vronskaya puts it in her artistic exploration of the mausoleum, "Shaping Eternity: the Preservation of Lenin's Body."[20] The idea of preserving his body for pilgrims to venerate was borrowed from the very Orthodox Christian church that the party was actively destroying. In the Orthodox and other Christian faiths, the bodies of saints are holy relics, unburied and presented in churches for veneration. The preservation of Lenin's body was a conscious inheritance of this tradition but also a perversion of it; whereas the bodies of saints are holy *because* they do not decay as normal bodies would, Lenin's body was artificially preserved from decay, thereby *manufacturing* his "holiness."[21] As a result of this feat of communist science, the Lenin I saw in 2018 looked as though he had died just then, not nearly a century ago. The mausoleum is therefore more complex a symbol than a mere statue to Lenin because it contains the body itself, "neither fully organic nor artificial … something in-between statue and body."[22] This kind of symbol is simply incomparable to, for example, the statues of Confederates in the United States or Nazis in Germany. While Lenin's mausoleum initially served to preserve his memory for all time to come, symbolizing his ideas of perpetual revolution and the communist conquering of death and time, the mausoleum's general significance has changed since its inception, as explained in Appendix A. Soviet identity evolved under different leadership and so did this dynamic, omnipresent symbol. Now that the Soviet people are no more, what does it symbolize for Russians today?

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[19] Vronskaya, "Shaping Eternity: The Preservation of Lenin's Body," 12.
[20] Ibid, 11.
[21] Gill, "'Lenin Lives': Or Does He? Symbols and the Transition from Socialism," 193.
[22] Kattago, "Haunted House: Memory, Ghosts and Political Theology in Lenin's Mausoleum."

The debate over Lenin's mausoleum can be reduced to two sides, pro-burial and anti-burial. This paper will first address the pro-burial arguments among Russian citizens, using recent polling data from the Levada Center, an independent Russian research organization, (see Appendix E) and older polling data with analysis from British political scientist Graeme Gill's article "'Lenin Lives': Or Does He? Symbols and the Transition from Socialism" (see Appendix D). On the whole, a slight and growing majority of Russians support the burial of Lenin over his continued presence in the mausoleum.[23] It seems, then, that most Russians are willing to put to rest this symbol of Lenin and his Soviet system. An outsider would assume that this rejection of his body is representative of a rejection of his beliefs. However, this is not exactly the case, as more polling data shows. In fact, when asked if Lenin played a positive or negative role in Russian history, the affirmative is a significant majority and much greater than the negative, ranging from a low of 53% in 2004 to a high of 65% in 1999.[24] Plotting the Levada Center's more recent data on support for burial and negative views of Lenin makes visibly apparent the lack of correlation between the two sentiments (see Appendix F). Seeing this discrepancy, Gill concludes that "the attitude to the fate of Lenin's body is not an accurate reflection of the popular evaluation of his role in history."[25] Gill's data further breaks down the reasoning behind supporting burial, revealing that the primary reason is in fact a moral or religious one: nearly 70% of respondents in favor of burial indicated that their support is because "It is necessary to follow Christian traditions [of burial]."[26] It is worth noting as well that supporters of burial tend to fit a given demographic: they are younger, more educated, more urban, and wealthier than those who oppose burial.[27] In other words, they are citizens who have succeeded in the new

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[23] Gill, "'Lenin Lives': Or Does He? Symbols and the Transition from Socialism,"181. and Левада-Центр, "Владимир Ленин." *Levada Center, "Vladimir Lenin."*
See Appendices D and E
[24] Gill, "'Lenin Lives': Or Does He? Symbols and the Transition from Socialism," 182.
[25] Gill, "'Lenin Lives': Or Does He? Symbols and the Transition from Socialism," 182.
[26] Ibid, 183.
[27] Ibid, 186.

Russia with its modern, cosmopolitan, European cities. Lenin is no longer a symbol of the Soviet Union because their personal lives have progressed past that era in history. If Lenin has ceased to be connected to his beliefs for those Russians in favor of burial, what does the symbol of his mausoleum mean to those Russians who would prefer that he remain?

A not insignificant minority of Russians oppose the burial Lenin (see Appendices D and E). Once again, this data does not align with the 53% to 65% range of positive views of Lenin in Russian history discussed above.[28] When asked for the reasoning behind their opposition to burial, most respondents indicated either "He is our history, a symbol of the Soviet epoch" or "He is a great historical figure."[29] For those opposing burial, Lenin *is* something of a symbol for the Soviet era. But even then, the phrasing of these poll answers does not indicate whether respondents view "our history" and the "Soviet epoch" positively, or what is meant by "great historical figure" ("great" is so broad a word that it can mean any number of things). To better understand Russian's views of the Soviet Union, let us consult data compiled by British Academy Fellow Stephen White's research on Soviet memory in his article "Soviet Nostalgia and Russian Politics." White found that a decreasing, yet significantly high portion of Russians hold nostalgic views of the Soviet Union (see Appendix G). This data mirrors the majority that view Lenin's role in Russian history positively. A deeper look, however, reveals why so many Russians remember Lenin and the Soviet Union positively. White's research indicates that much of the nostalgia connected with the Soviet Union arises from the relative economic security that Russians had before 1991, and which was ripped out from beneath them after 1991.[30] Many Russians' lives did not improve with their liberation from communism and it took nearly a decade before the country's fortunes turned a corner. Magdalena Banaszkiewicz, a professor at the Jagiellonian University in Poland specializing in the anthropology

[28] Ibid, 182.
[29] Ibid, 183.
[30] White, "Soviet Nostalgia and Russian Politics."

of tourism, makes the connection between the two phenomena of opposition to burial and Soviet nostalgia in her field research at the mausoleum itself. By examining visitor reactions and reading reviews for the site on TripAdvisor, she noted a common, but not universal, nostalgic experience for Russian tourists, associating the symbol of Lenin with their childhood or youth that happened to fall during the Soviet period.[31] All of this points to another disconnect in Soviet memory concerning the mausoleum. Though Russians who oppose burial do view Lenin as a symbol of the Soviet past, the Soviet past they have in mind might be a nostalgic one formed in their youth and reinforced by the hell of the 1990s, not the Red Terror and Civil War of Lenin's actual time in power. Demographic data from Gill confirms this suggestion: opposers of burial tend to be older, less educated, more rural, and less wealthy than those in favor of it.[32] That is to say, they are Russians who have been left behind in the new Russia.

Curiously, neither those in favor of nor those in opposition to burial view Lenin's mausoleum as symbol of his legacy. It follows that neither are thinking of the victims of that legacy either. If public attitudes among the Russian people are split, but not centered on Lenin's legacy, how is this reflected in their government? First, we will examine the pro-burial argument of the government. It is already known, however, that this is not the prevailing government attitude because Lenin has yet to be buried.

The politicians who favor(ed) burial are perhaps the only group for whom expectations meet reality. During his tenure as the newly formed Russian Federation's president in the 1990s, Yeltsin consistently fought to remove Lenin's mausoleum from Red Square.[33] According to The Economist in an editorial arguing for Lenin's burial, he "used this Bolshevik mummy as a prop in his tussle with

[31] Banaszkiewicz, "Dissonant Heritage and Dark Tourism at Lenin's Mausoleum," 86.
[32] Gill, "'Lenin Lives': Or Does He? Symbols and the Transition from Socialism," 186.
[33] The Economist, "Bury Lenin."

the communists."[34] Without going into too much detail, Yeltsin wrestled for political control of the new Russian Federation with what was left of the communists. In his political, and at one point actually violent, fight to bring a market economy to Russia, Yeltsin used the mausoleum as a symbol of the communist past and the communist political opponents that he was striving to vanquish. The Communist Party was still a formidable force then, however, and the Duma ultimately thwarted his attempts.[35] He did succeed, as noted in Appendix A, in removing the honor guard.[36] This move is not insignificant, though, as it reduced the status of the mausoleum as a state symbol worthy of military honor to a mere historical site. Since Yeltsin, some governments figures have expressed support for burial. For example, in 2011 Cultural Minister Vladimir Medinsky called "having him [Lenin] as a central figure in a necropolis at the heart of our country is sheer nonsense."[37] What Yeltsin, Medinsky, and like-minded politicians are expressing in their efforts to bury Lenin is easily understood and explained by Gill in his discussion of the mausoleum's inability to legitimize the new regime. Firstly, the mausoleum does not serve to build a national identity. Lenin was ethnically ambiguous himself and his beliefs were profoundly internationalist.[38] Such a symbol cannot legitimate the new, increasingly nationalist Russia. Secondly, as a symbol of the Soviet Union, the mausoleum to some degree actually delegitimizes the new regime that replaced it.[39] Recalling, the nostalgic symbolism of the mausoleum for some Russians, nostalgia inherently implies that the new is worse in some ways than the old. Put simply, Vladimir Lenin and his beliefs have nothing to do with the modern political state of Russia in the 21st century. What argument, then, does the government currently provide for keeping his body in Red Square?

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[34] Ibid.
[35] Kattago, "Haunted House: Memory, Ghosts and Political Theology in Lenin's Mausoleum."
Yes, the Communist Party still exists in Russian today. The Soviet one was abolished and a new one was formed in the 1990s. It is the permitted opposition in the Duma, Russia's legislature, to Putin's United Russia party.
[36] The Economist, "Bury Lenin."
[37] Kattago, "Haunted House: Memory, Ghosts and Political Theology in Lenin's Mausoleum."
[38] Gill, "'Lenin Lives': Or Does He? Symbols and the Transition from Socialism," 190.
[39] Ibid, 191.

When Putin succeeded Yeltsin as president of Russia in 1999, he brought with him a series of changes, with opposition to the burial of Lenin among them. Putin's reasoning tends to focus on the idea of stability. He would rather not "take any steps that would divide society," after so much chaos and uncertainty in the 1990s.[40] Similarly, he seeks to preserve a sense of continuity for Russia, admitting quite openly the lack of ideological underpinning for his regime: "What happened after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dominant ideology? … We never got anything in its place."[41] While Lenin is not an ideological symbol for Putin's regime, preserving an old symbol serves to not draw attention to the void left by Soviet collapse. Most powerfully, Putin argues that such a move would be a disservice to the older generations who lived with Lenin as a symbol, saying that burial would mean that "they had devoted themselves to false values and false objectives, that they had lived their lives in vain."[42] To Putin, the burial of Lenin would mean the repudiation of his beliefs. At the same time, Putin is hardly a Leninist or a fan of Lenin. Nevertheless, he is a symbol of the order that Putin is trying to replace and serves to preserve the continuity of Russian governments. Just as St. Basil's on Red Square is a connection to Russia's imperial past, having Lenin's mausoleum on Red Square is a connection to Russia's Soviet past. The new state of Russia is a synthesis of these two apparent opposites. That said, Putin has left the door open on the question of burial, suggesting that "the time will come and the Russian people will decide what to do" with Lenin's body.[43] This implies that while the meaning of the monument as a symbol of the past is certain, whether or not it should be venerated in Red Square is up for debate. Beyond Putin's beliefs, it should be noted that the second largest political party in Russia, the Communist Party, still uses Lenin as an ideological symbol and opposes burial on that account.[44] The fact that entrance to the mausoleum is free of

[40] Kattago, "Haunted House: Memory, Ghosts and Political Theology in Lenin's Mausoleum."
[41] Ibid.
[42] Gill, "'Lenin Lives': Or Does He? Symbols and the Transition from Socialism," 180.
[43] Kattago, "Haunted House: Memory, Ghosts and Political Theology in Lenin's Mausoleum."
[44] Ibid.

charge, despite the costs of maintaining Lenin's body, indicates a more than tacit government support for the mausoleum. Thus, the prevailing government argument against burial, the argument that ultimately decides Lenin's fate, presents Lenin as a useful symbol of continuity rather than representing any ideology.

The previous four arguments have established the lens through which this paper will view Lenin's mausoleum. To summarize, Russians in favor of burial tend to dislike the unnatural and immoral treatment of a dead body, rather than passing judgement on larger questions on Soviet memory. Russians opposed to burial do view Lenin as a symbol of the Soviet era, but do not necessarily connect their nostalgia for those times with Lenin's beliefs and policies. For the government in favor of burial, Lenin's mausoleum is a symbol of a Soviet past that is irrelevant to Russia's future. On the other hand, the current government view holds Lenin's mausoleum as a symbol of continuity with the past, a controversy that Putin would rather not address in the midst of more pressing challenges. Missing from all of these interpretations of the mausoleum is any consideration of the victims of Lenin's beliefs and system, the traumatic crimes of the Soviet era against an entire society. Not only are the interpretations of the symbol fractured, they also exclude such an important component of Soviet memory. Applying the theoretical frameworks of group identity and cultural trauma allows us to see that the phenomena of fractured interpretations and silence on Soviet crimes are broader than just one anachronism in tourist-packed Red Square and are actually indicative of and results of each other.

Recalling Russell's discussion of symbols as materializations of group identity, the enigma around the mausoleum's symbolism grows to concern the entire group identity of Russia. What "abstract concepts" of identity are associated with the mausoleum? No one can seem to agree; the entire country is looking at the same object but not seeing the same symbol. Obviously, a group identity need not have uniformity in its beliefs, but the fracturing of interpretations is of such a

degree in Russia's case that it calls into question the entire group's identity. Russell emphasizes that materialization, above all other "threads" of group identity, is "a fundamental, behavioural, participatory and interpretative aspect of humans in modern large groups."[45] If a group cannot agree on what symbols mean to them and what values they represent, they likely cannot agree on the values themselves. Such a fractured identity is precisely the phenomenon apparent in modern Russia.

In turn, Aydin's concept of cultural trauma provides an insight into the causes for Russia's fractured identity. Since Lenin's mausoleum is a historical monument, the struggle to interpret it is in fact a struggle to interpret history. Russia's fractured identity is a result of that history. The ongoing debate around Lenin's mausoleum is representative of the past hanging over Russia's present and future. Rather than actively forgetting the past, Russia continues to puzzle over it. Rather than "recognizing" the trauma left by Soviet crimes, the man who caused it remains on display and is dissociated from his legacy. Rather than "processing" the horror of those crimes, Russia refuses to confront its monstrosity. Rather than "sublimating" the pain into new form, Russia maintains a "holy" monument to the very originator of that repression.

It is worth discussing why Soviet memory is so fraught in modern Russia. Both the crimes suffered by the Russian people and their struggle to remember them defy comparison to other situations in world history. In terms of the severity of crimes, a comparison to the Nazi Holocaust is conceivable, but inadequate (not even considering the fact the Holocaust extended into Soviet territory and accompanied a host of atrocities during World War II; the trauma of Soviet terror confusingly overlaps with the trauma of Nazi terror). Alexander Etkind, Reader in Russian Literature and Cultural History in Cambridge University, pushes back against such a comparison in his essay "Post-Soviet Hauntology: Cultural Memory of the Soviet Terror." Whereas the Holocaust targeted a specific "other" for extermination, Soviet terror was indiscriminate in its victims and many went to

[45] Russell, "Freud and Volkan: Psychoanalysis, Group Identities and Archaeology," 190.

their deaths under false pretenses, often still believing in the communist cause that was murdering them.[46] If the Holocaust was murder, Soviet terror was suicide.[47] Both victims and perpetrators lived amongst each other and continued to do so after the terror had ended. There was no accountability, even after the collapse of Soviet Union.[48] Indeed, Yeltsin was president of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic before he was president of the new state. Today, its leader was formerly a KGB operative. Even awareness of Soviet crimes was inaccessible and a cultural taboo for decades under the tight censorship of the Soviet Union.[49] When the Soviet Union collapsed, finally bringing an end to censorship and opening up decades of archives for viewing, the Russian state lacked the stability and resources to requisite to process the past. Likewise, the Russian people were struggling to simply get by, much less process their history. This is not to excuse the inability of Russia to process Soviet memory, but to explain why such a task is so difficult in the Russian context.

Though it will be difficult for Russia to fully process its Soviet past, it must. Aydin makes clear that a society with unresolved trauma in its past can have no future, at least not a desirable one.[50] The fractured identity apparent in the views of the mausoleum are evidence of this unresolved trauma today and will remain until Russia comes to terms with the whole of its history. What that resolution will look like for Lenin's mausoleum is uncertain and complicated; as a part of Red Square, the mausoleum is a UNESCO World Heritage site, meaning that while Lenin's body can be moved, the temple itself cannot.[51] In the immortal words of Nikolai Gogol, "Russia, where are you flying to? Answer! She gives no answer."[52] Russia needs to find an answer, and the world should care

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[46] Etkind, "Post-Soviet Hauntology: Cultural Memory of the Soviet Terror."
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Aydin, "How to Forget the Unforgettable? On Collective Trauma, Cultural Identity, and Mnemotechnologies."
[51] Gill, "'Lenin Lives': Or Does He? Symbols and the Transition from Socialism," 179.
[52] Gogol was nineteenth century Russian writer. The quote is from his novel *Dead Souls*.

what that answer turns out to be. From resurgent imperialism in Ukraine and Georgia to increasingly undemocratic domestic policies, a lot more is at stake than the final resting place of that one man who died a century ago.

Appendix A
A timeline from the end of Lenin's life to now, highlighting the dynamic symbolism of his mausoleum.

(A) 1917 The February Revolution deposes Tsar Nicholas II, replacing the autocracy with a Provisional Government.	(B) 1917 Lenin leads the Bolsheviks in the October Revolution, overthrowing the Provisional Government.	(C) 1918-1923 Civil war rages in Russia. Lenin's Red Army defeats anti-Bolshevik White Army. ~8 million dead (famine included)	(D) 1924 Lenin dies. Mausoleum is created. Stalin rises to power by 1927 in Lenin's void.	(E) 1938 Lenin's costume changed at Stalin's request in order to downplay his role as revolutionary and elevate Stalin's.	(F) 1953 Stalin dies and joins Lenin in the mausoleum. See Appendix C for photographs.
(G) 1961 Khrushchev removes Stalin from mausoleum and buries him in Kremlin Wall (where other important figures lie too).	(H) 1991 The Soviet Union collapses, toppling Soviet symbols all over Eastern Europe. Yeltsin becomes president of the new Russian state.	(I) 1993 Yeltsin removes the military Honor Guard that used to stand watch over the mausoleum.	(J) 1999 Putin succeeds Yeltsin as president and signals that he will not bury Lenin.		

Sources: Vronskaya, "Shaping Eternity: The Preservation of Lenin's Body." and Kattago, "Haunted House: Memory, Ghosts and Political Theology in Lenin's Mausoleum."

Appendix B

A timeline of Soviet Terror. Estimates of death tolls are controversial to this day, but the upper figure is around 20 million. The traumatic effect of Soviet Terror cannot be overstated, but Chaliand and Blin describe it well in their book on the history of terrorism, "For [the Russian] people, this meant unremitting dread. Dread of hearing a knock on the door in the middle of the night; dread of disappearing forever. Collectively, the psychological toll was appalling and impossible to quantify. Insecurity, fear, and unpredictability were the order of the day. At work and even at home, suspicion was ubiquitous. The least false step or unguarded word could mean death or the Gulag. No prospect of an end was in sight, nor was faultless behavior any guarantee of safety."[53]



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Source: Chaliand and Blin, "LENIN, STALIN, AND STATE TERRORISM." and The Economist, "Bury Lenin."

Appendix C

[53] Chaliand and Blin, "LENIN, STALIN, AND STATE TERRORISM," 206.

From 1953 to 1961, the mausoleum housed both Lenin and Stalin.
Source: Baltermants, Dmitry. *Queue to the Mausoleum*. Photograph. *Russia in Photo*. Moscow, 1953. Multimedia Art Museum, Moscow / Moscow House of Photography. https://russiainphoto.ru/search/photo/years-1953-1961/?index=8&paginate_page=6&page=6.

The mausoleum in 2019. The busts on the left are part of the Kremlin wall necropolis, where other notable Soviet figures are buried, from Stalin to Gagarin.
Source: *Lenin's Mausoleum*. Photograph. Moscow, 2019. https://www.moscovery.com/lenins-mausoleum/.

Lenin's body in the mausoleum, though photographs by visitors are forbidden.
Source: *Lenin's Body*. Photograph. *Moscow Times*. Moscow, 2016.
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2016/05/05/in-the-flesh-russian-scientists-work-to-preserve-lenins-corpse-a52771.

Appendix D
Polling data on support for Lenin's burial for 1994-2006.

ATTITUDES TO THE BURIAL OF LENIN (%)

	Date of poll									
	January 1994	*March 1997*	*June 1997*	*July 1998*	*April 1999*	*August 1999*	*April 2002*	*April 2003*	*April 2004*	*April 2006*
Favour burial	45	48	54	55	53	41	48	52	56	46
Oppose burial	39	38	32	35	35	41	38	34	30	29

Source: Gill, "'Lenin Lives': Or Does He? Symbols and the Transition from Socialism."

Appendix E

More recent polling data on Lenin's burial for 1997-2017. Note that the "favor burial" category was created by the author, combining the two burial options from the original poll: burial at Volkovskoye cemetery in St. Petersburg and burial at the Kremlin wall.

Attitudes to the Burial of Lenin (%)

	Date of poll							
	August 1997	*December 2000*	*October 2005*	*April 2006*	*January 2008*	*January 2011*	*December 2012*	*March 2017*
Favor Burial	50	50	51	55	52	56	53	58
Oppose Burial	38	44	40	38	34	31	25	31
Do not know/difficult to answer	11	8	10	7	14	14	23	11

Source: Левада-Центр, "Владимир Ленин." *Levada Center, "Vladimir Lenin."*

Appendix F

A plot of support for burial (both cemetery and Kremlin wall options) and a negative view of Lenin (both "strongly" and "rather" options).



Source: Левада-Центр, "Владимир Ленин." *Levada Center, "Vladimir Lenin."*

Appendix G

Regret for the demise of the Soviet Union in three of its former states.



Source: White, "Soviet Nostalgia and Russian Politics."

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